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A Liberal Nationalist Theory of Secession

A Liberal Nationalist Theory of Secession

In A Liberal Nationalist Theory of Secession, Ruairí Maguire argues that nations can have a right to unilaterally secede from a legitimate, non-usurping state. They are special in this regard. There is a presumption in favour of collective autonomy by nations, establishing this claim by showing that co-nationality can be an intrinsically valuable relationship and that this grounds a strong claim to self-determination. There are no considerations that always defeat the presumption in favour of collective autonomy by nations. For example, unilateral secession from a legitimate state need not wrong citizens of the remainder state by wrongfully taking territory. As such, nations^—^and only nations^—^can have an undefeated right to unilaterally secede from a legitimate state. Maguire establishes the second part of the claim above^—^that nations are special in this regard^—^in two ways. First, he argues against more permissive accounts of self-determination, accounts that attempt to ground a right to secede for any territorially concentrated group capable of performing the basic functions of statehood and governing in a satisfactory manner. Secondly, he argues that despite the fact that other kinds of groups^—^such as religious groups^—^share the features in virtue of which nations have a claim to self-determination, the content of these groups’ identities is too narrow to be the basis of a pluralistic political identity. As such, they would wrong members of minority groups within their territory by seceding. This is not true of nations.
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A Liberal Nationalist Theory of Secession—

$168.49

$58.97

A Liberal Nationalist Theory of Secession

In A Liberal Nationalist Theory of Secession, Ruairí Maguire argues that nations can have a right to unilaterally secede from a legitimate, non-usurping state. They are special in this regard. There is a presumption in favour of collective autonomy by nations, establishing this claim by showing that co-nationality can be an intrinsically valuable relationship and that this grounds a strong claim to self-determination. There are no considerations that always defeat the presumption in favour of collective autonomy by nations. For example, unilateral secession from a legitimate state need not wrong citizens of the remainder state by wrongfully taking territory. As such, nations^—^and only nations^—^can have an undefeated right to unilaterally secede from a legitimate state. Maguire establishes the second part of the claim above^—^that nations are special in this regard^—^in two ways. First, he argues against more permissive accounts of self-determination, accounts that attempt to ground a right to secede for any territorially concentrated group capable of performing the basic functions of statehood and governing in a satisfactory manner. Secondly, he argues that despite the fact that other kinds of groups^—^such as religious groups^—^share the features in virtue of which nations have a claim to self-determination, the content of these groups’ identities is too narrow to be the basis of a pluralistic political identity. As such, they would wrong members of minority groups within their territory by seceding. This is not true of nations.

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In A Liberal Nationalist Theory of Secession, Ruairí Maguire argues that nations can have a right to unilaterally secede from a legitimate, non-usurping state. They are special in this regard. There is a presumption in favour of collective autonomy by nations, establishing this claim by showing that co-nationality can be an intrinsically valuable relationship and that this grounds a strong claim to self-determination. There are no considerations that always defeat the presumption in favour of collective autonomy by nations. For example, unilateral secession from a legitimate state need not wrong citizens of the remainder state by wrongfully taking territory. As such, nations^—^and only nations^—^can have an undefeated right to unilaterally secede from a legitimate state. Maguire establishes the second part of the claim above^—^that nations are special in this regard^—^in two ways. First, he argues against more permissive accounts of self-determination, accounts that attempt to ground a right to secede for any territorially concentrated group capable of performing the basic functions of statehood and governing in a satisfactory manner. Secondly, he argues that despite the fact that other kinds of groups^—^such as religious groups^—^share the features in virtue of which nations have a claim to self-determination, the content of these groups’ identities is too narrow to be the basis of a pluralistic political identity. As such, they would wrong members of minority groups within their territory by seceding. This is not true of nations.